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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LORRAINE JANE WILCKEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
LEONARD THEODORE WILCKEN, Case No. 16,772 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
----------------
R~spondent concurs with appellant's statement of 'the Nature 
of the case and of th~ Disposition in the lower court. 
Respondent seeks the aff irmance of the judgment of the lower 
court and for an award of the interest he has lost on his portion 
of the marital assets by reason of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
---------------------
The appellant and respondent were married on November 22., 
1972, in Salt Lake City, Utah. There were no children born as 
issue of the marriage ( R. 1, 26). The appella~t is in her late 
fifties and the respondent is in his early sixties (R. 209). The 
respondent is employed by the Utah Department of Transportation 
and the appellant is self employed. 
The trial court found that the respondent made a gross 
contribution of $64,442.50 to the combined assets of the marriage 
(R. 132). This amount was debLted.by $2,700.00 by reason of the 
return to respondent of certain property contributed by the 
1 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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respondent to the marital assets, for a net contribution of 
$61,722.50 ( R • 135) • The court found the appellant gross 
contribution was $23,000.00 to the combined assets of the 
marriage. Appellant's contribution was debited by $10,000.00 by 
reason of appellant's gift to her daughter by a previous marriage 
from joint funds of the parties, for a net contribution of 
$13,000.00. (R. 135) 
The court found that while both parties had 
contributions to the marriage: 
"all of the contributions b~ the parties should be 
deemed to have gone to the joint support and 
maintainence of both of them, and are not recoverable 
by either party and that the same should include such 
matters as the respondents wages, retirement 
contributions and any claims by appellant to have 
contributed additional sums from her savings account, 
bank account, wages, etc. (R. 135,136). 
Neither of the parties were to recover anything by 
reason of the same." (R. 138). 
made 
The parties acquired various pieces of real property during 
their marriage which are set out in the Second Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (P. 131-44). Respondent had 
contracted to purchase one parcel of ground, identified hereafter 
as the "Independence property", and had paid 70% of the purchase 
price, prior to the marriage. This piece of property was sold 
during the marriage. The court divided the prof it realized from 
said sale, 70% to respondent and 30% to the marriage. The trial 
court in dividing the assets of the parties held: 
"From the proceeds of the sale of the real and personal 
property of the parties, each party should first be 
reimbursed for the pre-marital property each 
contributed to the marriage. The remaining assets. 
should be divided equally between the parties." (R. 
135) • 
- 2 -
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Each of the parties were also to be debited for any of the 
marital or personal~property they claimed for their own. 
The appellant disputes the trial courts method of 
distribution of the equity in the real property located in 
Indepe-ndence· and the court's· ·findi'ngs· as to what were the net 
assets that each party contribut~d towards the marriage. 
POINT I 
--------
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
DIVIDING THE REAL PROPERTY OF ~HE PARTIES. 
Under Utah law, a.,, ... trial ·Judge is afforded considerable 
latitude of discretion in the disposition of property involve·d in 
a divorce proceeding and his judgment should not be changed 
U12_les.2_ it works such a mani.f,e.st .. injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
P.2d 1080 (Utah, 1'977). 
A party se.eking a reversal of the. trial court must prove 
that the court either misunderstood or misapplied the Law, 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; or, that the 
evidence c 1 early " prep on de rated a gains t the· · ·f ·in dings 1 or , that 
such a serious inequity resulted from the order as to constitute 
an abuse of discretion. (It is not the role of the appellate 
f oru·m in such cases to eva 1 uate the sagacity of the tria·l ·court's 
deci~ion, inasmrich as that decision is based on shadings of fact 
and circumstances unavailable to the reviewing court). 
v. ~c~~~~~J- 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah, 1979). 
The appellant does not challenge the fairness of the. trial 
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court's over-all decision governing the division of the partys' 
joint property. Ra the r , a pp e 11 ant ch a 11 en g e s on 1 y the fair n e s s 
of the division of the prof its from the sale of the Independence 
Property. 
The appellant's dissatifaction with the division arises 
because she was granted a percentage of the profits proportional 
to the amount which was contributed toward the original purchase 
price ~fter the marriage occurred rather than receiving an equal 
share of the entire sale profits. (As indicated in the statement 
of facts, the Independence property was acquired by the 
respondent before the marriage. Respondent had paid 70% on the 
purchase price from his funds, prio_E. to the marriage of the 
parties.) 
Appellant's claim to a greater share of the proceeds is 
based on three ( 3 ) supposed errors committed by the court: 
first, the appellant contends that she is entitled to an ~ual, 
not a proportional share of all equity developed during the 
marriage; secondly, respondent, after receiving a return of the 
payments he had made on the property prior to the marriage, 
should not be allowed to receive 70% of the remaining profits; 
thirdly, respondent's pre-marital assets should not have been 
credited with his pre-marital payments on the Independence 
property as this further reduced appellant's award. Though this 
property was acquired by respondent prior to the marriage, 
that the P rof its should be divided in the same appellant argues 
manner as 
the joint property acquired during the marriage. 
Appellant contends, that only her method and not the trial 
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,...._ .,.,;. 
court's, will produce an equitable division of the profits. 
Appellant's arguments d·o· not raise any questions of· the 
trial court's misapplication or misunderstanding of law, nor does 
appellant suggest any evidence which preponderates against the 
Rather, appellant ·.attempts to challenge the trial 
court's sagacity in the exercise of it's broad discretionary 
powers to decide such matters, by asserting that appellant's 
method is best. 
The trial court has the duty to cons·i.der various factors 
relati~~ to the situation and to arrange the best possible 
allocaiion of property and economic resources of the·parties so 
that the parties "can pursue their lives in as happy and 
usefu_l a manner as possible." Read v. _Read_._, s 94 P .2d a 11 
(Utah,- 1979). The record. r~veals that the triai·aourt considered. 
three (3) major faC't'::ors urged by respondent when deciding the 
distribution and a lloca ti on of the equity in the In dependence 
property:, .. · first, the Independene.e-"' property waS:.- acquired by 
respondent prior to the marriage (R. 132, paragraph•"'2-, ·-30.1); 
secondly, appellant and respondent 
thirty percent ( 3 0 % ) toward the 
jointly contributed 
purchase:; pri,ce. (R. 
only 
133, 
paragraph Sa); and third, appellant .,w.as not re.quir,ed to make an 
accounting of the property which she 1 had· acquired prior,; t.o the 
marriage, consisting of two (2) homes, one in Utah and the other 
in Wisconsin, etc. (R. 133, paragraph 3). 
Further, appellant neither provides nor attempts to provide 
a showing that' the trial court's - decision 'relating to· this· ·piece 
of property would either prevent the appellant from pursuing her 
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life in as happy and useful manner as possible, or that the 
decree was so discordant that it would lead to difficulties and 
distress to the appellant. ~~ad supra, at pg. 872. 
It is clearly respondent who would suffer an injustice if 
the appellant were allowed to share ~qually in the profits of the 
Independence property while contributing only a minor portion 
towards its purchase, and at the same time, not having to account 
for properties acquired by appellant prior to the marriage. 
Respondent asserts that when the trial court's decision is viewed 
in light of the facts, the decision clearly did not produce a 
serious inequity as to amount to an abuse of discretion, etc. 
Since it does not appear that the trial court was acting outside 
its discretion when it awarded the parties prof its from the sale 
of the Independence property-in. proportion.~o their marit~l and 
pre-marital contribution towards its purchase, the decision 
should be left undisturbed. 
Respondent again points to the fact that appellant does not 
dispute the fairness and equity of the ultimate judgment dividing 
the joint property. The appellant protests only the decision 
involving the equity in the Independence property. In Pea~, 
op. cit., the Supreme Court of Utah, felt it was significant that 
though the appellant was dissatisfied with the division of the 
pr 0 p e rt y , th at a pp e 11 ant had made no claim that the ultimate_,.,,., 
decision was unjust. Further, since appellant contests the 
f t then appellant has the burden of court's division o proper y, 
proving that the Findings of Fact did not sufficiently support 
the decree. Findings of Fact are deemed sufficient if they 
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ascertain ultimate facts and sufficiently conform to the 
piead~ngs and the evid~nce to support the judgme~t. (See Rule 52, 
U. R. C. P. ) 
Appellant's_ arguments in no way demonstrate that the trial 
court ' s Find in-gs of Fa ct are not s u f f i c i en t 1 y sup .P. qr t e d by. the 
evidence, gr~that the court's decision could not be supported by 
..... the Findings of Fact. Appellant's arguments relate soley· to 
appellant's opinion of an alleged inequity in the. division of the 
equity in ,.,the ... Independe,nc.e property. Where appellant has not 
shown that: the F~ndings of Fact do not suf f ici~ntly support the 
ultimate- dec-isio.n; ... or., shown w.here the court haa;. -rrdsunders:tood or 
mi s a pp 1 i e d the 1 aw; o r ,. ;-.,cannot . demonstrate any di s tr es s to the 
appellant from the ultimate decision; ... then the appellant has 
failed to bear its burden of showing an abuse of discretion. See 
As 
divorce 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
DEDUCTING RESPONDENT'S ALLEGED PRE-MARITAL 
INDEBTEDNESS FROM HIS PRE-MARITAL ASSETS. 
stated above, a trial, court whi;L~>-'' ... granting a decree of 
i·s afforded considerable discretion in the area of 
property ~distribution. In these matters a party seeking a 
reversal, must prove. a. misundertanding or missapplic;:ati.on of law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial,,.,.., error, or that the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the fin.d.in.gs or .that such 
a s er i o us .. inequity res u 1 t e d f r om the order a s to cons t. it u t e _ an 
abuse of the . tr i a 1 courts di s c re t ion • Mc Cr a .E1, op • cit • ... Fur the r , 
- 7 -
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the trial court's decision is to be indulged with a presumption 
of validity. ~it_~~~l:l. Y...:_ ~i_t_~hel_~, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974). 
The burden is therefore placed upon the appellant to .show by 
the facts that: the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
decision; the court either misunderstood the law, or misapplied 
it; or the cour's decision was grossly inequitable. Mere 
assertions of amazement such as those made by appellant towards 
the court's methods are not sufficient. 
The appellant offers no facts showing why the court's method 
was either error, prejudicial or inequitable. The only facts 
presented merely show that the court did not make the deductions. 
Without such a showing the appellant has not met her burden of 
showing an abuse of discretion. 
In support of the trial e>0urt' s decision the respondent 
again submits the,se facts that were considered by the trial 
court. 
1. The great majority of the respondent's pre-marital 
indebtedness was for a mobile home which the respondent 
had purchased for the parties to live in. The 
respondent did not count the mobile home as an asset 
which he cont r i bu te d to the marriage because of that 
debt. It was a "wash" transaction, i.e., value and 
indebtedness being equal. (R. 103) 
2. A large portion of the remaining debt was for the 
unpaid balance due on respondents GMC truck, which 
truck-- was used -in the ranching operations -from- which 
the appellant derived benefits. (R. 103) 
3. None of the appellant's pre-marital indebtedness 
was considered as a reduction against her pre-marital 
assets, nor was there a reduction of her pre-marital 
assets by reason of the reduction of that indebtedness 
that was made during the marriage. ( R. 102, 133) 
Therefore, in view of these facts which support the trial 
court's decision, and, appellant's failure to provide evidence 
- 8 -
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showing an abuse of discretion by the trial court, respondent 
submits that the· appellant's claim of error is without~merit. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR:IN REFUSING THE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL~ 
The appellant quotes Rule 59(a) URCP as support for a new 
trial: 
[a] a new tr i a 1 ~ b ~ 2 anted to· . a 11. or .. ,· any of . the 
parties in and on all or part of the ·issuew for any of 
"··"··the following causes "'• , • ( 4) ne·wly dis cove.red 
evidence, material for the party making the 
application ,.'.~:':·wgich ~ ~ld :l,9t, with reasonable 
?il~~~~' have discovered and produced at trial. 
(emphasis added) 
Appellant contend~ ·:that~~·she produced evidence consisting of tax 
"re tm r n s and s a 1 e s re c e i pt s , at a .E.9 s t tr i a J:. .!!!_ o t .!.£!'! , w hi ch t e s t e d 
the-respondent's credulity, and in light of that new.evidence a 
new tr±al should be granted. 
Rule 59 is a discretionary rule, which.specifically requires 
of reasonable a:Lligence, have .. been available for trial. 
--- ----
The 
court's refusal to grant. ,.a new ... trial was not error .-::where the 
allegedly newly discovered evidence was in appellant's possession 
at a l l t i me a rrd :. was re a son ab 1 y a proper subj e ct of discovery , 
~hich could have~been obtained by the exerc~se of due diligence. 
1977). Additionally, regarding any new evidence, we·· ·must 
- con-sider the governing principals long held by this court that 
the ·"newly" dis c"ove-red evidence 
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must appear, (2) not simply cumulative; (3) that 
such evidence is not sufficient if it simply be to 
·in:.£.~~_£_~ an adverse -;i tn-;;-;~-(4)-~ust be so material to 
the issues. • that the verdict and judgment would 
have been different had the newly discovered. evidence 
been introduced at the former trial; (5) that the 
defeated party had no opportunity to make the defense 
or was prevented from doing so by unavoidable accident, 
or the fraud or improper. conduct of the other party, 
w i thou t:_ !.~E-1-_t:. on h i s pa rt • Tr i m b 1 e v • Un i on Pa c i f i c 
· S ~~~-~, 1 0 5 Ut ah· 4 5 7 , 1 4 2 P • 2 d 6 7 4 { 1 9 4 3 ) ; St ate v • 
Moor~, 41 Utah 247, 126 P. 322 (1912); Klo~nstein Y..:.. 
~~' 20 Utah 45, 57 P. 712 {1899). 
Contrary to these guidelines, appellant specifically states 
that the new evidence produced by the appellant.was. "evidence 
which tested the defendant's credulity." App.ell.~nt offers no 
s1!_~in~ that the evidence presented at the post ,trial motions was 
I 
~:!:..'!:.he _E. new or · that with reason ab 1 e di l i gen c e it could not have 
--- -- ---
been discovered and presented at trial. Appellant must assert 
and prove those conditions as the bare minimums necessary to 
secure a new trial. Since appellant made no such claim to either~ 
the trial court or now on appeal, her appeal on this ground must 
fail. 
Additionally, appellant entirely neglects to make the 
essential showings that there was no.opportunity for her to make 
the evidence available at trial, and most critically that she was 
not at fault. In fact, all'· of the evidence that appellant 
alleges as being the basis for the new trial was in the exclusive 
control and purview of the appellant from the time this action 
was commenced. Appellant was requested to produce most of the 
items at the second hearing in Provo. However, she did not 
produce them, but claimed to have had them in a "box in the car." 
App e 11 ant with he 1 d the s e . documents fr om the respondent when he 
- 10 -
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needed them, but when she thought they would help her point of 
view at a :post-tri"a 1 hearing·,·. ·she was able to produce some, if 
not all of the documents. The trial court observed all of this, 
and must have considered the same in makLng its decision. 
Granti·ng·-.~a new trial based on newl"Y discovered evidence is 
"highly .d1scretionary" and "a matter wholly within the trial 
court's discretion." -·-It is ,nqt an abuse of that discretion to 
deny a new trial where the trial court "reasonably could have 
·-_·<determined ~hat such evidence would not. likely .ch-a-nge the ; .. re-sult 
or that_ the requirements of due diligence had .. not substantially 
been met." 
277; 348 P.2d. 930 (1960). The trial court's decision:-,;, 'in: refusing· 
to grant the appellant""a. ne.w _trial_ is conclusive unless there 
clearly appears to be an· - abuse of discretion. 
Man ~f~_t_~!:..!E-9. Co_._ v • F • I • W i 1 s _?_~ , 1 5 Ut ah 2 n d 2 1 0 , 3 9 0 .. P • 2 d 1 2 7 
(1964). Review by the Supreme Court is only--· available on a 
question of abase. of discretion by the tr Lal court. 
Utah 255, 53 P.2d 1155 (1936). Appellant does not even raise the 
issue of'~'~.the trial court'!? abuse of discretion wh-en it denied the 
appellant a new trial. ReS:Rondent'' respectively submits that 
'-'.~·,+, appellant has no grounds for a new trial based on new evi'dence 
inasmuch as appellant failed to show reasonable dil.igence by,:the 
appellant in obtaining evidence; unavailability of the evidence 
prior to ''tr ia:I:-; or, an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
These failures"',,._are intensified by appellant'~ •. own.,. exclusive 
control over the supposed new evidence and the fact that the 
11 -
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apparent sole purpose of the new evidence is an attempt to 
impeach respondent as a witness and to contradict existing 
evidence, all of which appears not to have a substantial bearing 
on the trial court's judgment. Appellant's. request for a new 
trial must therefore fail. 
THE COURT 
APPELLANT'S 
$10,000.00. 
POINT IV 
------
DID NOT ERROR IN DEBITING 
PRE-TRIAL ASSETS IN THE, SUM 
THE 
OF 
Again respondent must urg·e that by appealing the trial 
court's decision, appellant has the burden of proof to show that 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the decision. See 
Pe~~~.E_, op. cits. This showing must be strong 
enough to overcome the presumption of validity attached to the 
trial courts decision. 
The appellant claims that the court committed error when it 
debited the appellant's pre-marital assets by $10,000.00 which 
amount was paid to the appellant's daughter to supposedly 
purchase the daughter's alleged interest in the Woodshed 
business. The court concluded that money was a gift by the 
mother to the daughter rather than a payment and that the money 
came from the parties combined funds. Hence, the court debited 
the appellant's pre-marital assets for that amount (R. 135). The 
appellant's challenge to the court's conclusion must show that 
the evidence cleary preponderates against the trial court's 
decision. Any doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence is to 
be construed in favor of respondent. 
.·· 
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As evidence to support appellant's contention, the appellant 
';'.;' offers a' statement - by the respon.dent-.. (:R'"''" 3.14-) .. -and one by the 
appellant (R. :38£)- each to the :.effedt that the $10,000.00 payment 
was made on the prete·nse of· a payment for purchase of the 
daught$rs interest in the Woodshed. 
The transcript, however, testimony by ',·· the 
respondent that:· the daughters int~rest in the Woodshed was a gift 
as th~ daughter had made no cash investments in the business, and 
had only put in a few Saturdays working in the store while out 
visiting with her mothe'r··:·;:~f-. Further, the supposed purchase of the 
daughter ' s interest was ,., made----:. without respondent ' s ' kn o w·l e d g e or 
-~··_p:e'rmi s s i oh.-...-,' ( R. 315'1 • Appellant testified that· the money was 
given to the daughter because she was moving and needed the 
... -.:~money. ( R. 366). Appellant was unable to _,prov;ide proof_ that the 
$1-0~000.00 was not a gift to her daughter~(R. 281, lines 19-25). 
The court heard the.testimony, observed the demeanor of the 
parties and ·-doncluded."i;from~.':this evidence that the $10,000.00 
, -given b.y . a pp e 11 ant to her daughter was a gift • Therefore, the 
court rightly debited appellant's pre-marital assets accordingly. 
Appellant cannot provide any evidence.~' suf f ic ien t-·:: to rebut the 
trial£court's conclusion. Si rice ·appellant's burden of proof has 
not :• been met , her request to further modi f y the decree sh o u 1 d 
fail. 
. /'f/• 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT -1S ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON HIS 
PORTION .; O•F< THE MARITAL ESTATE DURING THE 
PENDENCY OF THIS APPEAL 
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Respondent believes the decision of the trial court was and 
is a fair and equitable distribution of the marital assets of ~he 
parties. Due to this appeal, which respondent feels is without 
merit, respondent has been unable to secur..e his portion of the 
marital estate. In fact, during the pendency of the appeal, 
appellant has refused to participate in making two ( 2) annual 
ins ta l lmen ts on the. "Bl uebe 11 property," and has withheld ,:f_rom 
the respondent two ( 2) payments on the "In dependence property." 
Respondent requests that pursuant to 15-1-4, U. C .A., 1953 as 
amended, that he be awarded interest from . the appellant on his 
share of the marital assets, at the rate of eight percent ( 8%) 
per annum, from and after appellant's filing of notice of appeal, 
until the property is sold. Respondent cites as additional 
authority for thi~ proposition, the following: Keller v. 
----
U.(2d) 85, 396 P.2d, 47; and Wo_9_dmont,_ Inc. v. Da_nie~, 290_F.2d 
186. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court does not demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion in the division of the property, the 
determination of contributions and deductions of the parties to 
marital assets or in refusing to grant appellant a new trial. 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed, and 
Should be a warded interest on his portion of the respondent 
marital assets at the rate of eight percent (8%) per annum from 
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and after the date of appellant's filing her notice of appeal 
herein. 
9~ 
Respectfully submitted this.;)_{!) day of May, 1980. 
MANGAN & GILLESPIE 
. "{\A 
Ge,_o ___ r --g ... ;-' .-Ma;g-;~-
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